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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The differences between the Republic of Acastus and the State of Rubria
concerning the Elysian Fields have been brought before the International Court
of Justice in accordance with Article 40(1) of its statute by notification of the
Compromis for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the
Differences between the Republic of Acastus (Applicant) and the State of
Rubria (Respondent) Concerning the Elysian Fields. This special agreement
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was concluded by the parties in Chicago, Illinois, USA, on September 1, 2005
and was notified to the Court on September 15, 2005. The Compromis
constitutes a statement of agreed facts but not an agreement to the Court's ad
hoc jurisdiction. Rubria has no objection to the admissibility of the matters
concerning the RABBIT. However, with respect to all other matters, including
Rubria's direct responsibility for alleged human rights violations, admissibility
is contested.
The Court is respectfully requested to decide the case on the basis of the
rules and principles of general international law, as well as any applicable
treaties.
The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including
the rights and obligations of the parties, arising from its judgment on the
questions presented in the case.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The State of Rubria respectfully asks this Court to decide:
I. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than those
under the RABBIT, since Acastus is not in continuation of Nessus
and has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in its
own right;
II. Whether Rubria exercises rights attendant to its sovereignty over
territory and natural resources and does not violate international law
by permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed;
III. Whether the actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under
international law, or in the alternative, did not violate any inter-
national legal obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus;
IV. Whether Acastus is in breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT by virtue
of the Acastian civil court's decision.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2000 the Republic of Nessus dissolved to form two new democratic
States: the Republic of Acastus (Applicant in this case), incorporating the rich
coastal plains north of the thirty-sixth parallel, and the State of Rubria
(Respondent in this case), incorporating the mountainous and largely
undeveloped southern half of Nessus's territory.
Rubria became a member of the United Nations [hereinafter UN] in 2001
and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
[hereinafter ICJ], making one reservation that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
any case in which the opposing state has not been a party to the Statute of the
Court [hereinafter ICJ Statute] for at least twelve months at the time of the
application to the Court. Rubria is, and Nessus was, a party to the Vienna
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Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT], the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR], and
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties [herein-
after VCST]. Acastus has not signed any of these treaties in its own capacity.
Rubria is also a member of the International Labour Organization [hereinafter
ILO] and Acastus is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development [hereinafter OECD]. Although Acastus claims to continue
the international legal personality ofNessus in both, membership in the UN and
in all treaties, the Security Council [hereinafter SC] states in its Resolution
2386 that Nessus has ceased to exist and that Acastus shall also apply for
membership. This resolution was subsequently interpreted by the Under-
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs in a memorandum to conclude that Acastus
can temporarily continue the membership of Nessus in the UN until it has been
admitted as a new member state. Several third states including Rubria have
protested against this interpretation because no devolution agreement has been
signed, Acastus does not encompass a majority of the land mass or population
of the former Nessus, and Nessus's armed forces were divided evenly between
Acastus and Nessus. Irrespective of these facts, Acastus has not applied for
membership.
Nonetheless, relations between Acastus and Rubria have largely been
friendly. In February 2002, both countries signed the Rubria-Acastus-Binding-
Bilateral-Investment-Treaty [hereinafter RABBIT], which inter alia guarantees
that Acastus will enforce all aspects of its domestic law in carrying out its
obligations under the treaty, including the Multinational Corporations Respon-
sibility Act [hereinafter MCRA], and that any disputes regarding the RABBIT
shall be referred to this honorable Court. The MCRA guarantees that in the
case of a violation of international law by an Acastian company in its conduct
abroad compensation will be provided to those harmed.
In May 2003, the Trans-National Corporation [hereinafter TNC], a limited
liability company incorporated in Acastus, and the government of Rubria
announced the formation of the Corporation for Oil & Gas [hereinafter COG]
in Rubria for the purpose of developing and exporting petroleum resources
discovered in northern Rubria. Exclusive rights to operate within the region
were promptly granted. TNC holds fifty-one per cent and Rubria forty-nine per
cent of shares in COG. Under the corporate charter of COG, all shareholder
decisions are made by simple majority vote, on a one-share, one-vote basis.
For the extraction and exportation of the oil, experts have recommended
the construction of a pipeline running through a territory used by the Elysians
for agriculture. The Elysians are an indigenous group with Acastian citizen-
ship, resident in Acastus and present only temporarily for the purpose of
agricultural activities. Although the construction through the Elysium would
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destroy half of the agricultural lands used by the Elysians and would reduce the
yields of the remainder, this is the only financially feasible route.
As the Elysians were likely to be hostile to this construction, COG
authorized and financed the creation of the Protection & Retention Operations
Force [hereinafter PROF] for the sole purpose of accompanying and guarding
their personnel.
A study ordered by the Acastian government and performed by the
Institute of Local Studies and Appraisals [hereinafter ILSA] delivered a report,
stating that the construction would make it impossible for the Elysians to
continue their way of life and accusing PROF of seizing young men from
among the Elysians and forcing them to work on the COG project.
On September 30,2004 a number of local NGOs concerned with minority
rights, Mr. Borius and an unincorporated group calling itself "Elysians for
Justice" brought an action for damages in an Acastian civil court against COG,
Rubria, PROF, and TNC. The action alleged that Elysians were forced to per-
form dangerous work without compensation. Jurisdiction over the case against
Rubria, COG, and PROF was based on the Acastian International Rights
Enforcement Statute [hereinafter AIRES], which grants Acastian courts j uris-
diction in cases where international law has been violated outside of Acastus,
as long as the defendant is present in Acastus. In the case against TNCjurisdic-
tion was based on the MCRA and alternatively on AIRES.
Whereas TNC and PROF were dismissed as defendants, Rubria and COG
were found jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for compensatory
damages in an amount equivalent to 200 million Euros. TNC was dismissed on
the grounds that the MCRA only imposes legal obligations on corporations
which directly operate abroad, the Act does not repeal the limited liability
principle, and that AIRES is not applicable because corporations cannot be
subjects of international law. PROF did not fulfil the requirement of presence
in Acastus. Rubria has vigorously protested against this illegal and extraterri-
torial judgement and does not accept it.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Claim I: This honorable Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than
those under the RABBIT, since Acastus is not the continuation of Nessus and
has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in its own right.
I. The Court lacks jurisdiction because the Court shall only be open to
State Parties according to Article 35 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Acastus is not the continuation of
Nessus because it does not meet the necessary criteria under
international law to legal identity. Therefore, Acastus cannot claim
2006]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
Nessus's status as party to the statute and therefore does not have
access to the Court.
II. Furthermore, the Court lacks jurisdiction because Acastus does not
continue Nessus's membership or its inherent rights sui generis and
thereby neither enjoys access to the Court, nor falls under its
jurisdiction. First, access to the Court cannot be granted on the basis
of sui generis status because no such right sui generis exists and
second, Acastus did not declare submission to the ICJ as required
under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statue.
Claim II: By permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed,
Rubria exercises rights attendant to its sovereignty over territory and natural
resources and does not violate international law.
I. Rubria has not violated international treaty law. Acastus cannot
claim rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights because Acastus has not automatically succeeded Nessus as
party to the ICCPR. In the alternative, Rubria has not violated the
ICCPR because first, the Elysians are not "peoples" in the sense of
ICCPR Article 1. Second, the Elysians are not Rubrian nationals and
have not demonstrated the required element of stability on Rubrian
territory. Third, Rubria has not violated Article 27 because agricul-
tural activities are not included in its scope of protection. Fourth, in
the alternative, Rubria's fundamental right to economic development
supersedes Elysian claims.
II. By permitting the construction of the pipeline, Rubria has not
violated customary international law.
Claim III: The actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under
international law, or in the alternative, did not violate any international legal
obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus.
I. The actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under international
law because first, PROF acted as a private legal entity and not as a
state organ of Rubria, and second, no de facto relationship exists
between PROF and Rubria which entails state responsibility under
international law. Neither did PROF exercise elements of Rubrian
governmental authority, act under Rubrian instruction or under the
direction or control of Rubria, nor can the alleged conduct be
attributed to Rubria due to a "failure to control." Third, Rubria bears
no responsibility due to so-called "supporting and harboring."
II. In the alternative PROF's actions did not violate any international
obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus, because they do not constitute
internationally wrongful acts. In the alternative, Acastus is estopped
from holding Rubria legally responsible for conduct that it already
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guaranteed to Rubria in the RABBIT would not be committed by
Acastian companies.
Claim IV: Acastus has violated RABBIT Article 52 by failing to enforce
all aspects of its domestic law.
I. TNC's influence and control over COG and PROF constitutes
"conduct abroad," requiring the attribution of the alleged human
rights violation under RABBIT Article 52. First, the term "conduct
abroad" under MCRA Section Four must be interpreted according to
international law due to its incorporation into the RABBIT and the
accompanying declaration by the Acastian prime minister, and
second, TNC is liable for human rights violation committed by COG
and PROF under international customary law.
II. Acastus violated the RABBIT Article 52(2) by failing to enforce
AIRES provisions, leadings
I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CLAIMS OTHER
THAN THOSE UNDER THE RABBIT
The court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than those under the
RABBIT because Acastus is not in continuation of Nessus and therefore does
not have access to the court, and has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court in its own right.
A. Acastus is not in continuation of Nessus and therefore does not have
access to the Court.
According to Article 35 of the Statute of the ICJ,1 the Court shall be open
to States Parties. Article 93(1) of the UN Charter2 stipulates that only UN
members can become parties to the Statute. Acastus is neither member of the
UN nor party to the Statute because UN membership was not automatically
transferred to Acastus as successor to Nessus, and furthermore, Acastus does
not continue Nessus's membership or its inherent rights suigeneris and thereby
neither enjoys access to the Court, nor falls under its jurisdiction.
1. Acastus is not a UN member because Nessus's membership cannot
automatically be transferred to its successor and Acastus does not fulfill the
requirements of state identity.
Under customary international law continuation of membership in
international organizations can only be established when the emergent and
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 35.
2. U. N. Charter art. 93.
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former states are identical.' A mere successor state does not assume the rights
and obligations of the predecessor.4 Legal identity is required,5 which must be
derived from certain objective and subjective criteria according to the merits
and circumstances of each case.6 Acastus has fulfilled neither the objective nor
the subjective criteria for state identity which have emerged in customary
international law:
a) Acastus has not assumed the majority of Nessus's territory;
b) Acastus has not incorporated the dominant share of Nessus's
population and military infrastructure;
c) Third States have not accepted Acastus's claim;
d) A devolution agreement has not been signed by Rubria and
Acastus.
a. Acastus has not assumed the majority of Nessus 's former territory.
Under customary international law a clear majority of the former state's
territory is necessary to establish state identity.7 Continuation claims involving
the incorporation of seventy-five per cent of the former territory have been
accepted (e.g. India and Russia),' while claims of states incorporating forty per
cent have been denied (e.g. Pakistan).' Furthermore, both the Czech Republic
3. U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 1st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947); The
Succession of States in relation to Membership in the UnitedNations, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/14 (1962), reprinted
in [1962]2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 101, [hereinafter Succession of States Memorandum]; Legality of Use of
Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Can.), 2004 I.C.J. 1, 10-11 (Dec. 15) (separate opinion of Judge Kreea) [hereinafter
Opinion of Judge Kreca]. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80(6th ed. 2003).
4. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 598 (Sept.
11); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 620-21.
5. See KONRAD G. BOHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2001); Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership
in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 41 (1995).
6. See U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 42nd mtg., Annex 6b, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/162 (1947).
7. See OLIVER DORR, DIE INKORPORATION ALS TATBESTAND DER STAATENSUKZESSION 131-40
(1995); See also RALF WITTKOWSKI, DIE STAATENSUKZESSION IN VOLKERRECHTLICHE VERTRAGE UNTER
BESONDERERBEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER HERSTELLUNG DER STAATLICHEN EINHEIT DEUTSCHLANDS 58 (1992);
ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN, STAATENNACHFOLGE IN VOLKERRECHTLICHE VERTRAGE 70 (2000).
8. Kashi Parasod Mirsa, Succession of States: Pakistan's membership in the United Nations, 3
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 283 (1965); Yehuda Z. Blum, UN. Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia:
Continuity or Break, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 832 (1992); See Indian Independence Order, U.N. GAOR, 2d
Sess., 6th Comm., Annex 6c, at 3b U.N. Doc. A/C.6/161 (1947); Scharf, supra note 5, at 50, 59.
9. G.A. Res. 108 (I1), at 1451, U.N. Doe. A/399 (Sept. 30, 1947); Succession of States
Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8.
[Vol. 13:1
Distinguished Brief
and the Slovak Republic, incorporating sixty per cent and forty per cent
respectively,' were obliged to apply for new membership in the UN."
After the dissolution of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter SFRY), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY)
contained only forty per cent of the territory;" therefore the UN rejected its
claim of continuation.' 3 Therefore, because Acastus and Rubria both assumed
fifty per cent of Nessus's former territory, Acastus has no clear majority and is
not identical with Nessus.
b. Acastus has not incorporated the majority of Nessus 's population or the
dominant share of its military infrastructure.
Only when a new state incorporates the majority of the former state's
population and the dominant share of its military infrastructure the state can be
considered identical to the former state.' 4 India's claim was accepted because
it incorporated eighty per cent of British India's population, 5 while Russia's
claim was accepted because it incorporated more than half of the Soviet
Union's population 6 and assumed the dominant share of its enormous military
infrastructure. 7 In contrast the FRY contained less than half of the SFRY's
population and was not accepted as identical to the SFRY.' 8 As Acastus
incorporated only fifty per cent of Nessus's population and military apparatus
it cannot claim to be identical to Nessus.
c. Acastus cannot claim to be identical because third states have not
accepted this claim.
Third states' acceptance or non-acceptance of continuation claims is an
important subjective element.'9 Although the FRY claimed to continue the
10. See Mary Battiata, Czechs, Slovaks Set "Velvet Divorce ", WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 28, 1992,
at A25.
11. G.A. Res. 47/221, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/221 (Jan. 19, 1993); G.A. Res. 47/222, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/222 (Jan. 19, 1993).
12. Blum, supra note 8, at 833.
13. G.A. Res. 47/1, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992); S.C. Res. 777, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992).
14. See DORR, supra note 7, at 131,140; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 7, at 70, 71.
15. Scharf, supra note 5, at 50.
16. Blum, supra note 8.
17. Scharf, supra note 5, at 51.
18. G.A. Res. 47/1, supra note 13; S.C. Res. 777, supra note 13; Marc Weller, The International
Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
19. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 639; DORR, supra note 7, at 142; ZIMMERMANN, supra note
7, at 77.
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SFRY's UN seat,2" the claim was not accepted by the USA, Canada, Japan,
Australia, and members of the European Community.2 Rubria and several
other states have vigorously and consistently protested against Acastus's claim
to continue Nessus's membership, thereby demonstrating that Acastus's claim
must also be rejected.
d Nessus's dissolution was not concluded with a devolution agreement.
A major subjective requirement for continuation is the existence of a
devolution agreement.22 Even though Russia fulfilled all objective criteria
illustrated above, the UN nonetheless made clear that it was only possible for
Russia to continue the USSR's membership in the UN because of the Alma Ata
devolution agreement between the USSR, Belarus, the Ukraine, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. 23 India was also able to continue
British India's membership in the UN because of the existence of a devolution
agreement.24 Until today, the two successor states of Nessus have failed to sign
a devolution agreement, indicating that the consent of the states immediately
concerned and necessary for the continuation of the former state to be accepted,
has not been established.
2. Acastus does not enjoy Nessus's membership or membership rights,
including access to the Court sui generis.
Until Acastus has applied for new membership in the UN, it would be
incompatible with international law to temporarily continue Nessus's member-
ship or certain membership rights sui generis because the Charter does not
provide for rights derived from a sui generis position, and the 2004 judgments
of this Court in Legality of Use of Force25 make clear that sui generis status
does not grant access to the Court.
20. Scharf, supra note 5, at 59.
21. See G.A. Res. 47/201, U.N. Doe. A/RES/47/201 (Dec. 22, 1992).
22. Paul R. Williams, State Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political
Criteria v. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations, 43 INT'L & COmP. L. Q. 776, 783 (1994); See
BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 623.
23. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 I.L.M.
151 (1991); See Scharf, supra note 5, at 68.
24. See Indian Independence Order, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 6th Comm., Annex 6c, at 308-10, U.N.
Do. A/C.6/161 (1947).
25. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Can.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 15) (Preliminary
Objections) [hereinafter Legality of Use of Force].
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a. The Charter does not provide for rights derived
from a sui generis position.
The provisions of the Charter, as far as the relationship of the UN vis-6-vis
states is concerned, have been formulated in exclusive terms of a member
state/non-member state dichotomy.26 Because Acastus is not a member to the
UN, it therefore does not enjoy any rights attendant upon UN membership
b. Sui generis status does not grant access to the Court.
The position taken by the UN by accepting the FRY as a new member state
in 2000 and this Court's judgments in the Legality of Use of Force document
the legal irrelevance of a state's sui generis position. Although the FRY's
continuation claim was rejected by the UN, the FRY was defacto allowed to
participate in particular work of the UN. In Application for Revision27 this
Court examined the issue of a sui generis position for the FRY and stated that
it was unable to deny locus standi to the FRY in the Genocide Case"8 due to the
unclear and unprecedented situation before it and therefore developed the
ambiguous term ofsui generis status.29 In its 2004 judgments in Legality of Use
of Force however, this Court clarified that a sui generis position is generally
not legally relevant and ruled that "sui generis, "is not a prescriptive term from
which certain defined legal consequences "accrue" and "no final and definitive
conclusion was drawn... from this descriptive term on the amorphous status
of the [FRI] vis-6-vis or within the United Nations. 30 It further stated that "the
sui generis position of the Applicant could not have amounted to its
membership in the Organization 3 ' and came to the conclusion that the FRY
was not a member of the UN, and in that capacity a state party to the statute of
the ICJ. 32 As emphasized in Judge Kreca's dissenting opinion in Genocide
Case (Application for Revision), the FRY's so-called sui generis position was
considered insufficient for establishing access to the Court.33 In light of the
final clarifications in the above cases, the fact that Acastus enjoys certain de
26. Opinion of Judge Kreca, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 20.
27. Application for Revision of the Judgment of I 1 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Yugo. v. Bosn. & Herz.),
2003 I.C.J. 7 (Feb. 3) (Preliminary Objections) [hereinafter Genocide Case (Application for Revision)].
28. See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11) (Preliminary Objections) [hereinafter
Genocide Case].
29. See Genocide Case (Application for Revision), 2003 I.C.J. 7, at 70.
30. Legality of Use of Force, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at T 73.
31. Id. at 77.
32. Id.; Opinion of Judge Kreca, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 20.
33. See Genocide Case (Application for Revision), 2003 I.C.J. 7, at 30 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Kreca); Legality of Use of Force, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 89.
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facto participation rights despite its unresolved identity does not create legal
circumstances amounting to access to this Court.
B. Alternatively, Acastus's sui generis position does not imply that it
automatically continues Nessus's declaration of submission to the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction.
The submission of a former state generally does not have binding effect on
successor states.34 The judgment in the Genocide Case (Application for
Revision) supports this position, as the Court stated that it explicitly based its
jurisdiction on ICJ Statute Article 35(2)"5 in connection with Article 9 of the
Genocide Convention 36 and not on the FRY's sui generis status.37 Acastus did
not declare its submission to the ICJ as required under Article 36(2) of the ICJ
statute. 38  Acastus did not apply for membership, evidently seeking to
circumvent Rubria's reservation to the statute, under which it only accepts the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court when the opposing state has been a party
to the ICJ statute for at least twelve months. If Acastus had applied for
membership as requested, jurisdiction could not be granted in the present case
due to the Rubrian reservation. For these reasons, the Court does not enjoy
jurisdiction in this case.
II. BY PERMITTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PIPELINE AS PROPOSED,
RUBRIA EXERCISES RIGHTS ATTENDANT TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER
TERRITORY AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND DOES NOT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Rubria does not violate the ICCPR or customary international law.
A. Rubria has not violated international treaty law.
Acastus cannot claim rights under the ICCPR39 and alternatively, Rubria
has not violated the ICCPR.
34. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 7, at 672.
35. . Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 35.
36. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
37. See Genocide Case, 1996 I.C.J. 595, at 41; Legality ofUse ofForce, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 87.
38. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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1. Acastus cannot claim rights under the ICCPR because Acastus's claim of
automatic succession to the Convention must be denied.
According to the rules of customary international law codified in Articles
34 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties4", a treaty generally
only creates rights and obligations for the contracting parties. 41 Acastus never
became party to the ICCPR in its own capacity and can therefore not invoke
articles thereof, as it neither signed nor ratified this treaty as required in ICCPR
Articles 48(1) and (2).42 According to the clean slate principle, Acastus does
not enjoy rights under the ICCPR because it is not in continuation of Nessus;
successor States do not automatically succeed in party status because VCST
Article 3443 does not represent customary international law. 44 Israel explicitly
stated in its 1948 Declaration of Independence that it was not bound by any
treaties "on the basis of generally recognized principles of international law;' ' 5
additional state practice confirms this principle.46 E.g. Israel emphasized that
a singular declaration of succession cannot have constitutive effect.47 Just as
UN membership is strictly personal in character,48 party status to human rights
treaties is directly connected to the legal personality of the state. Acastus is
therefore not a party to the ICCPR and thus not entitled to invoke articles
thereof.
2. Alternatively, Rubria has not violated the ICCPR.
Alternatively, Rubria has not violated the ICCPR because the Elysians, as
an indigenous group, are not "peoples" in the sense of ICCPR Article 1, and do
not constitute a minority entitled to protection under ICCPR Article 2741 in
Rubria.
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 34, 36, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
41. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 127 (May 26) (Preliminary
Objections); See generally Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 7, at 29 (May 25).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 48, Mar. 23, 1976,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
43. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 34, Aug. 22, 1978, 17
I.L.M. 1488 (1978).
44. Genocide Case, 1996 I.C.J. 595, at 109-11 l(dissenting opinion judge Kreca); Shigejiro
Tabata, Interim Report by the Committee on State Succession, in 9 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 173 (1965); See Anthony A. Lester, State Succession and Localized Treaties, 4
HARV. INT'L L. CLUB J. 145, 153 (1962); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1992).
45. Lester, supra note 44, at 145, 153; See YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW
STATES OF AFRICA 158 (1983).
46. Tabata, supra note 44; See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44.
47. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 7, at 562; MAKONNEN, supra note 45.
48. U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 1st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947); Scharf,
supra note 5.
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 27.
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a. The Elysians are not 'peoples " in the sense of ICCPR Article 1.
The ICCPR must be interpreted according to the rules of the VCLT.5
According to VCLT Articles 31 and 32, a treaty's terms must be interpreted
according to their ordinary meaning; if terms remain ambiguous, the travaux
prdparatoires may be consulted.5 Diverse opinions can be found on the
interpretation of the term "peoples" in Article 152, because the wording leaves
the meaning obscure.53 The travaux prparatoires document that minorities
were not included in the term "peoples" nor accorded the right of self-
determination at the time of drafting.54 In multinational states, such groups
must be of comparable size to other groups and be constitutionally recognized
as a people.55 The term "peoples" implies all people-the demos-and not
separate ethnoses or religious groups.56 Even if the Elysians partially possess
these characteristics, they are not constitutionally recognized as a people by
Acastus or Rubria and are not comparable in size to other groups, as they
consist of only approximately 5,000 people. The Elysians have instead
demonstrated that they are part of the Acastian people by accepting Acastian
citizenship and actively participating in the Acastian government. The ILO's
1957 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention categorized indigenous
populations solely as members of the national population.5 7 When the ILO
50. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CPPR COMMENTARY
952-53, 994 (2d ed. 2005).
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31,32, May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331; See
Lighthouses Case (Fr. v. Greece), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.62, at 4, 13; Conditions of Admission of a State
to Membership in the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), 1948 I.C.J. 57, at 63 (May 28); Competence of the
General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3). See generally
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 1 I (May 16) (Advisory Opinion).
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 1.
53. KNuT IPSEN & EBERHARD MENZEL, VOLKERRECHT 407 (5th ed. 2004); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 230-31 (5th ed. 2003).
54. U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., at14-15, U.N. Doc. A/2929, (July 1, 1955); Sub-Comm. on Prevention
of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Study: The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of the
UnitedNations Resolutions, at 9, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. I (Mar. 1981) (prepared by Hector Gros
Espiell); Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Study: The right to Self-
Determination, Historical and Current Development on the Basis of UnitedNations Instruments, at 41, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.A/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1 (198 1) (prepared by Aureliu Cristescu); Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination
of People, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 96
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); IPSEN, supra note 53, at 413.
55. CASSESE, supra note 54, at 92, 94-96; IPSEN, supra note 53, at 409.
56. ANNA MEUKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF MINORITIES
AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (2001); See generally U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 18,
82, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (July 19, 1993).
57. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, CONVENTION ON INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL
POPULATIONS, ILO No. 107, art. 1 (June 2, 1959), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/convdispl.htm (last visited Sep. 28, 2006) [hereinafter ILO 107].
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recognized indigenous groups as peoples in ILO Convention 169, it clarified in
Article 1(3) that no legal consequences can be derived from this term. 58 States
have not supported documents like the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, which attempted to grant indigenous groups inter alia the
right to self-determination. 9 For these reasons, the Elysians do not enjoy the
right of self-determination as an indigenous group, and Rubria, therefore, did
not violate ICCPR Article 1.
b. Rubria has not violated ICCPR Article 27 because the Elysians are not a
protected minority on Rubrian territory.
Rubria has not violated ICCPR Article 27 because the Elysians are not
Rubrian citizens and have not demonstrated the required element of stability on
Rubrian territory, and Article 27 does not include agricultural activities in its
scope of protection. Even if the Elysians and their farming practices are pro-
tected under Article 27, Rubria's fundamental right to economic development
and other vital State interests supersedes Elysian claims.
i. The Elysians are not Rubrian nationals and have not demonstrated the
required element of stability on Rubrian territory.
Article 27 is not applicable to aliens because the drafting process confirms
that the term minority only implies groups of nationals.6" Being nationals of
Acastus and not of Rubria, the Elysians do not fall under the protection of
Article 27 in Rubria. Alternatively, a minority must additionally fulfill the
requirement of "existence" in the relevant state to be protected under Article 27.
As can be derived from the travauxpr~paratoires, stability was emphasized in
the definition of minorities in order to prevent recognition of immigrants,
migrant workers and other forms of "new minorities."'" During the drafting, the
GA emphasized the necessity of distinguishing between long-established, well-
defined minorities, and temporary visitors, who, on account of their transient
58. Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169, June 27,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989).
59. See Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/! 992/28
(June 23, 1992); See also IPSEN,supra note 53, at 412; See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res.
60/I, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/l (Oct. 24, 2005).
60. PARTICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 171 (1991); See
generally Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. ofMinorities, Study of the Rights Belonging
to Ethnic, Religious andLinguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 (1977) (prepared by Francesco
Capotorti).
61. The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, U.N. GAOR, 1 0th Sess., at 63 186,
U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955); MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 495 (1987); NOwAK, supra note 50, at 646.
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relationship to the host state, should not be entitled to enjoy the same rights.62
In order to fulfill these criteria, an ethnic group must have inhabited a tradi-
tional settlement area within the state for a significant period of time.63 The
Elysians are not a long-established group with a settlement inside Rubria
because they enter and leave Rubria daily for work. Therefore they fail to
satisfy the element of stability required for the attribution of minority status in
Rubria.
ii. Rubria has not violated Article 2 7 because agricultural activities are not
included in its scope ofprotection.
Article 27 prohibits State parties to "deny to minorities the right to enjoy
their own culture, profess their own religions, or use their own language."' If
the enjoyment of culture includes protection of a particular way of life
associated with the use of land, this solely addresses a relationship with the land
that would give rise to a distinct culture.65 The Human Rights Committee
accepted the 1976 expropriation of the one hundred and twenty-five year old
Rehbooth community in Namibia because cattle raising cannot create such a
relationship to the land "that would have given rise to distinctive culture."66
Because it cannot be assumed that Elysian agricultural practices create a
relevant cultural link to the occupied territory, Rubria has not violated Article
27 by allowing the construction of the pipeline.
iii. Alternatively, even if the Elysians and their agricultural practices are
protected, Rubria's fundamental right to economic development supersedes
Elysian claims.
Even if states are required to uphold minority rights under the ICCPR,
these rights are not absolute.67 The Human Rights Committee stated in
Lovelace that state parties may restrict minority rights to residential areas of the
minority when such measures "have both a reasonable and objective
62. See The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., at 181,
184, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955); NOWAK, supra note 50, at 646; CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, Protection of
Minorities under Article 27 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in VOLKERRECHT ALS
RECHTSORDNUNG-INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKErr-MENSCHENRECHTE: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HERMANN
MOSLER 949, 961 (1983).
63. Fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 1993: Ger. 22/02/96, at 244, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/84/Add.5 (Feb. 22, 1996).
64. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 27.
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 10-28, 2000, J.G.A. Diergaardt v.
Namibia, 10.6, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., H.R.C., Communication No.760/1997,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (Sept. 6, 2000).
66. Id.
67. NOwAK, supra note 50, at 658.
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justification."68 Others claim that Article 27 rights are limited by other rights
guaranteed under the ICCPR or general limitation clauses such as ICCPR
Article 18(3).69 Under Article 18(3), States may limit ICCPR rights in order to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms under their own legal systems.7" The
Rubrian people enjoy the right to self-determination under ICCPR Article 1,
including the right to development and the right to exploit their natural
resources. Development is recognized as an inherent right,7' inseparable from
self-determination and fundamental to human rights. 72  Even assumed that
agricultural activities in Rubria establish similar ties as habitation, e.g. Article
1 1 of ILO Convention No. 107 explicitly allows for the removal of indigenous
people for reasons of national economic development. 73 As Rubria's economic
development depends on the exploitation of oil resources and the construction
of the pipeline through the Elysium, Rubria's right to development provides a
reasonable and objective justification for the restriction of any Elysian rights
connected to the Elysium and must prevail over rights protected in ICCPR
Article 27.
B. Rubria has not violated rights of the Elysians under customary
international law.
Under customary international law, minority protection is limited to the
general rights of equality and non-discrimination.74 Several governments,
including France, consistently interpret Article 27 as applying only to countries
which have adopted the ICCPR without reservation.75 In the alternative, even
if the scope were expanded to include the rights contained in Article 27,
attempts to grant additional rights to indigenous peoples have failed due to lack
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, IM 15-16,
U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., H.R.C. Communication No. 24/1977, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/I (July 30,1981); See
NOWAK, supra note 50, at 655 and accompanying text.
69. NOWAK, supra note 50, at 667; See Tomuschat, supra note 62, at 976 and accompanying text;
See also Louis B. Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF
PEACE 38 (1968).
70. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 18(3); NOWAK, supra
note 50, at 430.
71. Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41 st Sess., Supp. No.
53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986); IPSEN, supra note 53, at 440.
72. See generally U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 261, U.N. Doc. A/48/141 (1993).
73. 1LO 107, supra note 57, at art. 11.
74. Individual opinion of Rosalyn Higgins, T.K. v. France, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.40,
H.R.C. Communication No. 220/1987, in Report of the Human Rights Committee, Volume 1I, Appendix H1,
at 125, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Oct. 4, 1990).
75. Id.; See also NOWAK, supra note 50, at 641.
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of acceptance on the international plane.76 Because customary international law
does not exceed the protection standards for minorities established in the
ICCPR, the construction of the pipeline would not violate rights enjoyed by the
Elysians.
III. THE ACTIONS OF PROF ARE NOT IMPUTABLE TO RuBRIA UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR ALTERNATIVELY, DID NOT VIOLATE ANY
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION OWED BY RUBRIA TO ACASTUS.
As this honorable Court stated in Elettronica Sicula, an allegation of state
responsibility should not be made lightly.77 Hence, the criteria for invoking
state responsibility must clearly be satisfied before raising an allegation.
A. PROF's actions cannot be imputed to Rubria.
1) PROF acted as a private legal entity and not as a state organ of Rubria,
2) no defacto relationship exists between PROF and Rubria which entails state
responsibility under international law, and 3) Rubria bears no responsibility due
to so-called "supporting and harboring" PROF.
1. PROF did not act as a State organ of Rubria.
The status of an organ must be determined by the state's internal law."
Because PROF does not have this status under Rubrian domestic law, it did not
act as an organ of Rubria. Although it is argued that the status of organ should
additionally be examined under international law in exceptional cases,79 this
position has not gained international acceptance, as evidenced by objections
raised in the drafting process of the ILC Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility."0 Also, while it is claimed that "all officers and men in authority"
represent the state and act on its behalf,8 retired and former military personnel
are nowhere classified as organs of state. Therefore, PROF clearly did not act
as an organ of Rubria.
76. Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, supra note 59; IPSEN, supra note 53, at
412; See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 59.
77. See Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
78. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in United Nations
International Law Commission Report on the work of its fifty-third session, U.N.GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at43, U.N.Doc.A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafterILC Draft]; See THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 91 (James Crawford ed.,
2002) [hereinafter Crawford].
79. Crawford, supra note 78, at 98, Art.4 11.
80. International Law Commission, State responsibility: Comments and observations received from
Governments (Poland), U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515/Add.2 (May 1, 2001).
81. Crawford, supra note 78, at 94, Art.4 3 and accompanying text.
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2. No de facto relationship exists between PROF and Rubria which entails
State responsibility under international law.
As a general principle of international law, "the conduct of private persons
or entities is not attributable to the State., 82 As held by this honorable Court in
Nicaragua, only the actions of private persons or entities acting as de facto
organs or agents under the instruction, direction or effective control of a state
can be imputed under customary international law.83 This was confirmed in the
ILC Draft. 84 PROF has not acted a) as a defacto organ of Rubria, b) on instruc-
tions given by Rubria, or c) under its direction or control. Furthermore, d) the
actions of PROF cannot be imputed to Rubria due to a "failure to control."
a. PROF did not act as a defacto organ of Rubria exercising
elements of governmental authority.
"The fact that a state initially establishes a corporate entity, whether by
special law or otherwise, is not a sufficient basis for attribution to the state of
the subsequent conduct of that entity." 85 According to ILC Article 5, solely the
conduct of entities empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of
governmental authority shall be considered an act of state.86 The internal law
in question must specifically authorize the conduct as involving the exercise of
public authority.87 It is not sufficient that internal law permits activities as part
of the general regulation of the affairs of the community.88 Proposals to delete
the phrase empowered "by the law of that State" in the ILC Draft, referring only
to the vague term "elements of governmental authority" without further clarifi-
cation" are incompatible with customary international law and are therefore not
82. Crawford, supra note 78, at 110, Art.8 9 1; See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 437 and accompanying text.
83. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
at In 109, 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 9 301 (Dec. 19, 2005) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icojudgments/icojudgment_20051219.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2006)
[hereinafter Armed Activities].
84. Crawford, supra note 78, at 110-11, Art.8 4.
85. Crawford, supra note 78, at 112-13, Art.8 16; See Schering Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 361 (1984); Otis Elevator Co. v. Iran, Iran Award 304-284-2, 1987 WL 503815 (1987); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
86. Crawford, supra note 78, at 112-13, Art.8 16.
87. See Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 72 (1985); Crawford, supra note 78, at
113, Art.897.
88. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 7.
89. International Law Commission, State responsibility: Comments and observations received from
Governments (Japan), U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., at 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 (Mar. 19, 2001).
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reflected in the final version.90 No Rubrian law authorized PROF or COG to
engage in any specific conduct, in particular the exercise of any governmental
authority. The Rubrian Ministry of Natural Resources approved COG's
contract with PROF as a shareholder and not on the basis of an internal law.
PROF therefore did not act as a defacto organ of Rubria.
b. PROF did not act under Rubrian instruction.
PROF did not act under Rubrian instruction in perpetrating the alleged
actions because Rubria did not exercise the necessary decisive influence over
COG to qualify its approval of the contract between COG and PROF as giving
instructions. Alternatively, the alleged actions of PROF were not committed
under specific instructions from Rubria and can therefore not be imputed.
i. The Rubrian Ministry of Natural Resources did not issue instructions to
PROF when it approved the contract between COG and PROF.
The conduct of private entities has only been attributed to the state in
exceptional cases where evidence showed that "the State was using its owner-
ship interest in or control of a corporation specifically to achieve a particular
result."'" In Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases, even the actions of a fully state-
owned oil company were not attributed to the state as there was no proof that
the state used its ownership interest as a vehicle for directing a company to
seize property.92 As documented in these cases and specifically addressed in
European Competition law concerning shareholder responsibility, shareholders
must have decisive influence over a corporation's actions in order for these
actions to be attributed to the shareholder.93 Necessary decisive influence can
only be established when the shareholder fully owns the subsidiary or possesses
more than fifty per cent of the subsidiary's shares, enabling it to effectively
90. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 7.
91. Crawford, supra note 78, at 112-13, Art.8 6 and accompanying text; See Foremost Tehran,
Inc. v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228 (1986); American Bell Int'l Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib.
Rep. 170 (1986).
92. See Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 23 (1987); Int'l Technical
Products Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206 (1985); Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 335 (1986).
93. See Case C-286/98, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 1-09925, 61;
Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd. v. Comn'n, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 692 (Advocate General Mayras);
Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Comm'n, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 14-16;
Joined Cases 6/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm'n, 1974
E.C.R. 223, 26-31; See also Peter Jan Kuyper, European Community Law and Extraterritoriality: Some
Trends and New Developments, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1013, 1016-21 (1984).
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control the company's activities.94 COG enacted simple majority voting
procedures for shareholder decisions in its corporate charter. Rubria, holding
forty-nine per cent of shares, was not able to overrule TNC or otherwise control
COG's policies. Therefore, Rubria, as its minority shareholder, did not have
the decisive influence over COG necessary for it to be in a position to issue
instructions to PROF.
ii. Alternatively, the alleged Human Rights violations by PROF were not
committed according to specific instructions by Rubria.
"A State, in giving lawful instructions to persons who are not its organs,
does not assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in an
internationally wrongful manner."95 Human rights violations committed by the
Nicaraguan Contras were not imputable to the U.S. because they were not
carried out under specific instructions of the CIA.96 In the present case, Rubria
did not issue specific instructions to PROF. Rubria merely approved a contract
between COG and PROF, authorizing PROF to guard COG personnel. This
contract did not authorize or instruct PROF to force Elysians to perform
dangerous work without compensation. Rubria therefore clearly did not
specifically instruct PROF to commit the alleged actions.
c. PROF did not act under the direction or control of Rubria.
Rubria did not i) exercise effective control over the actions of PROF, ii)
Overall control would not be sufficient to impute actions of private individuals
or entities to a state, and iii) even if overall control were sufficient to entail
responsibility, Rubria did not exercise this level of control over PROF.
i. Rubria did not exercise effective control over the actions of PROF.
This Court previously examined the degree of control necessary for
attribution of private actions to a state in Nicaragua, where it established that
responsibility is based on effective control-actual participation and
direction-by a state.97 "A general situation of dependence and support would
be insufficient to justify attribution of the conduct to the state."9" As shown
above, Rubria did not give specific instructions or directions to PROF.
94. Id.; See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationalsfor Human Rights Violations
in European Law, in NON STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 276 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter De Schutter].
95. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 8.
96. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at I 109, 115.
97. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 62, 64-65, 86, 109, 115.
98. Crawford, supra note 78, at 110-11, Art.8 4; Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. 14, at 109-115.
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Furthermore, Rubrian officials did not participate in the actions at issue.
Therefore, Rubria did not exercise effective control over PROF.
ii. Overall control is not sufficient to impute actions ofprivate individuals
or entities to a State.
No argument to the contrary can be drawn from Prosecutor v. Tadic
(Appeal); Tadic did not examine the issue of state responsibility, " but solely
determined the existence of an international conflict and the application of
international humanitarian law on the basis that the FRY exercised overall
control' over the Bosnian Serb Army. Additionally, the inapplicability of the
overall control doctrine does not conflict with Tadic because, as rightfully held
by ICTY Judge Shahabuddeen, a violation of international human rights or
humanitarian law requires a higher degree of control than an illegal use of
force.'' In contrast, it would contravene rules of customary international law
referenced in Nicaragua and confirmed in the ILC Draft if the broader Tadic
criteria were applied in the present case of state responsibility.' 2 Overall
control is therefore not sufficient to impute the actions of PROF to Rubria.
iii. Even if overall control is sufficient for invoking responsibility, Rubria
did not exercise this degree of control over PROF.
As held in Tadic, overall control is established when the state not only
finances and equips forces, but also plans, participates in and supervises
military activities. 0 3 In Tadic, "forces were almost completely dependent on
the supplies [of the state] to carry out offensive operations."" 4 In this case,
Rubria did not equip PROF, because PROF independently determined its
equipment needs and procured those items on the open market. Rubria did not
participate in the planning and supervision of the alleged activities, as it had no
decisive influence or control over COG or PROF. As held in Jorgic and cited
in Tadic,'°5 State organs or officials must actively participate in the conduct
beyond financing and providing technical equipment in order to establish
99. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. lT-94-1-I, Appeals Chamber, Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen,
114, 18, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 1611 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic]; Crawford, supra note 78, at 111-12,
Art.8 5.
100. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at 141.
101. Id.
102. Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 301, (Separate Opinion of Judge Simma),
at 29, (Separate Opinion Kooijmans), at 25; Crawford, supra note 78, at 111-12, Art.8 5.
103. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at IN 145, 160.
104. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at 155.
105. See Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at 130 and accompanying text.
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overall control, specifically using the term "Verpflechtung."'' 0 6 In the present
case, only PROF personnel participated in the alleged actions. As former
members of the Rubrian armed forces were completely discharged from service
before joining PROF, PROF personnel cannot be considered State organs or
officials of Rubria. Therefore, Rubrian organs and officials clearly did not
participate in PROF's activities. Attribution of ultra vires acts beyond acts of
state organs as stated in ILC Draft Article 9, is not compatible with customary
international law as enshrined in Nicaragua.0 7 In any case, this claim is only
brought forward concerning acts committed under a state's effective control,'0 8
which, as demonstrated above, Rubria did not exercise over PROF at any time.
Alternatively, PROF's activities clearly went beyond instructions. As PROF
was mandated by COG only to guard COG personnel, the conduct in question
was clearly incidental. Therefore, PROF's actions do not give rise to ultra vires
attribution to Rubria under international law.
d. The alleged conduct cannot be attributed to Rubria
due to a 'failure to control."
As this Court held in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the
"mere failure to control the activities of armed ... bands in itself cannot be
attributed to the territorial State as an unlawful act."'0 9 Therefore, Rubria
cannot be held responsible for the alleged acts because it was merely the situs.
According to Article 9 ILC Draft, conduct may be attributed to a state "in the
absence or default of the official authorities" when the conduct effectively
relates to the exercise of governmental authority and occurred in situations
where a state has lost control or collapsed."0 The conduct here cannot be
attributed to Rubria for "failure to control" because PROF did not exercise
elements of governmental authority nor had Rubria lost control over its
territory, including the Elysian Fields.
3. PROF's actions are not imputable to Rubria due to
"supporting and harboring."
Attempts to legally justify military action in Afghanistan and Iraq
following September I Ith have not changed the general rules of state
responsibility for the attribution of private acts to the state relevant in this case.
106. Id.
107. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 7 109, 115; Cf Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116,
at 301.
108. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 18.
109. Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 301, (Separate Opinion of Koojimans), at
24.
110. Crawford, supra note 78, at 114-15, Art.9 IM 3, 5.
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Some scholars claim that the principle of "supporting and harboring" contains
a special standard of imputability between terrorist groups and host states,"'
while others claim that Article 51 also applies to armed attacks of non-state
origin."'2 As the factual and legal situation surrounding September 11 th is not
comparable to the present case and PROF's actions cannot be considered
terrorist acts, they would certainly not be imputed to Rubria under such
standards.
B. Alternatively, PROF's actions did not violate any international
obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus.
The alleged actions did not violate an international obligation owed by
Rubria to Acastus because Acastus is not party to the ICCPR and the actions
did not violate customary international law. They do not amount to prohibited
forced labor because the Elysians were adequately compensated for their
efforts. Alternatively, Acastus cannot make such a complaint venire contra
factum proprium as the actions are attributable to the Acastian domestic
corporation TNC and furthermore imputable to Acastus itself. Acastus is
estopped from holding Rubria legally responsible for conduct which it
guaranteed to Rubria in the RABBIT would not be committed by Acastian
companies.
IV. ACASTUS HAS VIOLATED RABBIT ARTICLE 52 BY FAILING TO ENFORCE
ALL ASPECTS OF ITS DOMESTIC LAW.
If COG and PROF have in fact violated the human rights of the Elysians,
Acastus has violated obligations toward Rubria contained in RABBIT Article
52 by dismissing TNC as a defendant in the Borius litigation on the basis of a
too narrow interpretation of "conduct abroad," because TNC's influence and
control over COG constitutes "conduct abroad" under MCRA Section Four,
therefore requiring the attribution of COG's and PROF's conduct to TNC, or
alternatively, Acastus failed to enforce provisions contained in AIRES,
constituting a violation of Article 52 RABBIT.
111. Albrecht Randelzhofer, The Charter of the UnitedNations, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VS. LIBERTY? 34 (Christian Walker et al. eds., 2004); See
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
112. Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 301, (Separate Opinion of Simma), at 13,
(Separate Opinion of Kooijmans), at 23; Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory
Opinion - An Ipse Dixit from the IC]?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005); See generally Markus Krajewski,




A. TNC's influence and control over COG and PROF constitutes "conduct
abroad" requiring the attribution of the alleged human rights violations to
TNC under RABBIT Article 52.
RABBIT Article 52 in connection with MCRA Section Four obliges
Acastus to grant jurisdiction in all cases where a violation of Section Four by
an Acastian domestic company is alleged. Acastus violated this obligation by
dismissing TNC from the Borius litigation because the term "conduct abroad"
must be interpreted according to international law and thus, human rights
violations of COG and PROF must be attributed to TNC because TNC
exercised sufficient influence and control over COG and PROF to cause a duty
of care to arise under international law.
1. The term "conduct abroad" in MCRA Section Four must be interpreted
according to international law.
Although the MCRA was originally passed as domestic law, its
incorporation into the RABBIT and the December 15, 2002 declaration by the
Acastian prime minister evidence that MCRA provisions have taken effect
between Rubria and Acastus and must be interpreted according to international
law. Due to the incorporation by reference, the MCRA becomes a rule of
international law in effect between Rubria and Acastus. Because investment
treaties are instruments of international law, arbitrators "should have recourse
to the rules of general international law to supplement those of the treaty.""' 3
ICSID Convention Article 42(1) reflects the generally accepted principle of
customary international law that the domestic law of the host state and the
applicable rules of international law govern the interpretation of investment
treaty provisions if no explicit choice of law is made. 14 The RABBIT does not
provide for an explicit choice of law for the interpretation of its treaty
provisions. Therefore, the application of the principle of limited liability as
under Acastian domestic law by the Acastian civil court is incorrect. Instead,
the interpretation must be governed by Rubrian law as law of the host state and
the rules of customary international law.
113. Antonio Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated Under Investment
Treaties, 16 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 21 (2001); Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R.
Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration, at
10 (2.2.2), (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment int-human-rights-bits.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
114. Convention on the Settlements of Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States, Art.
42, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
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2. TNC is liable for human rights violations committed by COG and PROF
under international law.
TNC is liable for human rights violations committed by COG and PROF
under international law because customary international law establishes parent
company liability for human rights violations, and TNC exercised sufficient
influence and control over COG and PROF to establish liability for their human
rights violations.
a. The customary international law principle ofparent company
liability applies in cases of human rights violations, particularly in
cases offorced labor.
According to ICJ Statute Article 38(1), ageneralpractice acceptedas law
is required for customary international law to emerge.115  State practice
encompasses all legally relevant acts, including those within international
organizations and between states. 1 6 State practice and opiniojuris affirm that
the parent company of a multi-national corporation owes a legal duty of care to
those affected by its subsidiary operations, provided there is sufficient
involvement in and control over the subsidiary operations by the parent. 117
This notion, i) reflected in the decisions of supra- and international courts, is
derived from State practice of ii) national courts inter alia in the European
Union, USA, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Australia, and iii) manifested
in the recently created guidelines and declarations of major international
organizations.
i. Supranational and international Courts' decisions confirm the legal
responsibility ofparent companies.
This Court already confirmed in Barcelona Traction that the principle of
limited liability has no unrestricted validity under international law when it
stated that "lifting the corporate veil" or "disregarding the legal entity" can be
115. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1); North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G.
v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20).
116. IPSEN, supra note 53, at 215; OTTO KIMMINICH & STEPHAN HOBE, EENFTHRUNG IN DAS
VOLKERRECHT 184 (8th ed., 2004).
117. See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter UN
Norms on the Responsibility ofTransnational Corporations]; Cf Steven R. Ratner, Corporations andHuman
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); Daniel Aguirre, Multinational
Corporations andthe Realisation ofEconomic, Social and CulturalRights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53 (2004);
See also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003); De Schutter,
supra note 92, at 227.
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justified at the international level under certain circumstances or for certain
purposes. 8
In its prevailing case law, the European Court of Justice applies rules
accepted by Member States when it emphasizes that the fact that a subsidiary
has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of
imputing its conduct to the parent company ... in particular where the subsi-
diary, although having separate legal personality, does not decide independently
upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the
instructions given to it by the parent company. 119
In European Competition law, the so-called "single economic unity
approach" E° demands that piercing the corporate veil may be possible in some
cases, for instance where the parent corporation fully owns the subsidiary or
possesses more than 50% of the shares of the subsidiary company, so that it is
in a position to control effectively its activities, or where the boards of directors
of both companies are composed essentially or fully of the same individuals. 2 '
ii. State practice evidences the legal responsibility of controlling companies
in cases of human rights violations, in particular where forced labor
occurred.
Recent U.S. court decisions based on the Alien Tort Claims Act122 have
ruled that a fictitious legal separation of activities to insulate the parent
company from liability for subsidiaries' activities is not (generally) permitted
under U.S. or international law. 123 Court decisions in the United Kingdom,1
24
Australia,125 and the Netherlands 26 have upheld the principle of parent company
responsibility in a similar manner.
118. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 l.C.J. 3, at 56
(Feb. 5).
119. Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd., 1972 E.C.R. 619, at 132-33; Case 107/82, AEG-Telefunken
AG v. Comm'n of the European Cmty's, 1983 E.C.R. 315 1, at 49; Europemballage and Continental Can,
1972 E.C.R. 215, at 15; De Schutter, supra note 94, at 279.
120. De Schutter, supra note 94, at 279.
121. De Schutter, supra note 94, at 276; AEG-Telefunken, 1983 E.C.R. 3151, at 50.
122. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).
123. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (Cal. App. 2002); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969
F. Supp. 362, 370-71 (D. La. 1997); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
124. Lubbe v. Cape Pic., [2001] 1 W.L.R 1545 (A.C.).
125. Dagi v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. & Anor (1997) 1 V.R. 428.
126. Gerrit Betlem, Transnational Litigation Against Multinational Corporations in Dutch Courts,
in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 283 (Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi
eds., 2000).
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iii. Recently created guidelines and declarations confirm parent company
responsibility for human rights violations committed by subsidiaries and
significantly influenced companies.
States' commitment to create a legal framework for multinationals is
reflected in the OECD's Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises-directly
referenced in the MCRA-according to which "to the extent that parent
companies actually exercise control over the activities of their subsidiaries, they
have a responsibility for observance of the Guidelines by those subsidiaries."' "
The most recent reflection of state practice is the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities ofTransnational Corporations approved by the United Nations
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which
define a transnational corporation as an enterprise, whether of public, private
or mixed ownership, comprising companies of two or more countries,
regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which
operates under a system of decision-making centers, in which the entities are
so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them exercise a
significant influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share
knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others. 128
A paramount concern in drafting the norms for exclusive application to
transnational corporations was that an inadequate definition "would allow
businesses to use financial and other devices to conceal the transnational
nature" of their operations, and thus avoid responsibility.'29 As the leading
expert in the drafting committee stated, the "Norms constitute a succinct, but
comprehensive restatement of the international legal principles" derived from
treaties and customary international law. 130 Forced labor is included as
prohibited conduct in both the OECD and the UN guidelines, and furthermore
in the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy'3' which are all generally accepted by the inter-
national community.
127. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Text, Commentary and Clarifications, at 9,
(Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/
4f7adc214b91a685c12569fa005d0ee7/dIbadale7Oca5d9Ocl256af6005ddad5/$FILE/JTO0 115758.PDF (last
visited Oct. 4, 2006).
128. UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, supra note 117, at 1(a).
129. Weissbrodt et al., supra note 117, at 909.
130. Weissbrodt et al., supra note 117, at 913 and accompanying text.
131. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 1.L.M. 422, para. 6 (Nov. 16, 1977).
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b. TNC exercised sufficient influence and control over COG and PROF to
establish liability for their human rights violations.
Although COG maintains a separate legal personality from TNC, TNC
nonetheless exercises significant influence over COG because it effectively
controls its activities, including those of its subcontractor PROF. In 2003
TNC's Chief Executive Officer Silvia Euterpe announced at a shareholders'
meeting that TNC was actively exploring commercially viable strategies for
exploiting the oil resources discovered in the southern Elysium. TNC then
founded COG in 2004 solely for the purposes of developing and exporting these
resources. TNC has not only exercised significant influence over COG since
its creation, it also continues to exercise exclusive control over COG because
it holds fifty-one per cent of COG's shares and appoints the majority of its
board of directors following simple majority voting procedures. COG therefore
cannot independently pursue its own policies and must instead carry out the
instructions of its majority shareholder. Although the Elysians supposedly
labored under PROF's supervision, TNC, as COG's majority shareholder, had
the authority to direct and control PROF's activities. For these reasons, the
conduct in question must be attributed to TNC.
B. Acastus violated RABBIT Article 52(2) by failing to enforce AIRES
provisions.
Because TNC is situated in Acastus, it is clearly present in Acastus for the
purposes of AIRES. The Rubrian claim cannot be rejected on the grounds that
TNC lacked subjectivity under international law. First, subjectivity is conferred
on Acastus under RABBIT Article 52 in connection with MCRA Section Four.
It binds Acastus to grant jurisdictions in all cases where a violation of those
rules is alleged, thus conferring legal personality on Acastian domestic corpora-
tions in regard to their compliance with all governing norms of international
law. Secondly, it is grossly inconsistent to claim that TNC, a private company,
cannot be subject to international law provisions on human rights, as the
Acastian courts must have assumed subjectivity under international law for the
private company COG when it was sentenced to compensation under the
AIRES in the same lawsuit. Thirdly, corporations must be held individually
liable for violations of international law committed in complicity with state
actors.' 32 Furthermore, because the plaintiffs in the Acastian civil court's case
incorrectly claimed that the human rights violations were committed by Rubrian
132. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1996); Eastman Kodak Co., 978 F.
Supp. at 1091-92; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 (1966); Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 6 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 494-507 (2001).
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officials, a state action requirement for subjectivity of TNC would have been
met. At minimum transnational companies must be subjects of international
law in cases of grave human rights violations such as forced labor.
13
Therefore, even if this honorable Court decides to interpret the term "conduct
abroad" in MCRA Section Four according to Acastian domestic law, Rubria has
violated its obligation vis-2i-vis Acastus under RABBIT Article 52 in
connection with the provisions of AIRES on the basis that TNC is responsible
for the alleged conduct of COG and PROF under international law.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUBMISSIONS
The State of Rubria respectfully requests this honorable Court to adjudge
and declare that:
I. The Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than those
under the RABBIT;
II. By permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed,
Rubria exercises rights attendant to its sovereignty over territory
and natural resources and does not violate international law;
III. The actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under
international law, or alternatively did not violate any
international legal obligation owned by Rubria to Acastus;
IV. Acastus has violated RABBIT Article 52 by failing to enforce
all aspects of its domestic law.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents of the Respondent
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